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Introduction
We consider the interplay of climate change impacts, global mitigation policies, and the interests of developing countries to 2050. The analytical focus is on three case countries: Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia-all countries containing the Zambezi river basin (ZRB) as a prominent physical feature. While case studies have well known limitations in terms of their ability to generalize results, the detail afforded in case studies can provide new insights. The framework employed here is arguably the most advanced and comprehensive ever applied to the analysis of climate change for a developing country. The structural approach to biophysical and economic modeling and the explicit treatment of climate uncertainty represent prominent advantages. Importantly, we are able to rigorously compare climate, biophysical, and economic outcomes across global mitigation regimes. We focus here on these comparisons.
We find that effective global mitigation policies generate two sources of benefit by 2050. First, under effective mitigation, the distribution of future climate outcomes is characterized by mean and mode values closer to historical norms with reduced variance compared to a scenario with unconstrained emissions globally. These less distorted climate outcomes result in typically more favourable biophysical and economic outcomes. In all three countries, the mean and mode of the distribution of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2050 shifts to the right (favourably) and the variance declines under successful mitigation.
Second, like nearly all low income countries and most middle income countries, the three case countries are structural importers of fossil fuels. Because successful global mitigation policies can be expected to reduce fossil fuel prices (relative to the case of unconstrained emissions), the case countries experience substantial terms of trade gains.
The sum of these two gains vary by case countries but are mainly greater than one per cent of GDP and range above seven per cent in the case of Mozambique. These gains are roughly equivalent to or greater than the global welfare costs associated with mitigation to about 550 ppm CO2eq of about 1.2 to 3.3 per cent (Edenhofer et al. 2014) . Gains associated with a stabilized climate can be expected to be much greater in the second half of the 21 st century (Field et al. 2014) . We conclude that the case countries considered have clear interests in seeing effective global mitigation policies enacted, even over relatively short time frames. This conclusion likely pertains to many other developing countries with implications for their negotiating positions with respect to participation in global mitigation regimes and associated financial flows.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section reviews the methods employed. The subsequent section considers outcomes for: temperature and precipitation; world commodity prices with an emphasis on fuels; biophysical outcomes with an emphasis on runoff; and economic outcomes with a focus on GDP in about 2050. In each of these subsections, outcomes between a scenario characterized by unconstrained emissions (labeled UE) and a scenario characterized by successful global mitigation policy that stabilizes atmospheric concentrations to about 560 ppm CO2eq (labeled L1S for level 1 stabilization) are compared. A final section discusses implications for developing countries.
Methods
The approach employs a chain of modeling frameworks as illustrated in Figure 1 . It starts with the Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM) in the top box labeled 'Global Change' (Sokolov et al. 2005) . The IGSM consists of three primary components:
i.
Economics, emissions, and policy cost component for analysis of human activities, including policy measures, as they interact with climate processes;
ii. Climate and Earth system component: coupled dynamic and chemical atmosphere, ocean, land, and natural ecosystem interactions and feedbacks; and iii. Land ecosystems and biogeochemical exchanges component, within a global land system framework, for analysis of the terrestrial biosphere.
The IGSM is well suited for the analysis of mitigation policies. The economics component is represented by the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, which is a relatively detailed dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the global economy (Paltsev et al. 20015 ). The EPPA model provides economically coherent emissions projections based on the detailed structure of domestic production, consumption and international trade, evolution of advanced technologies, depletion of fossil-fuel resources, land requirements, and population growth among other items. In addition, policies to reduce emissions or target particular emissions rates can be imposed on the model. As a result, EPPA generates global price paths for fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas), alongside other commodities, in accordance with the selected policy regime (Paltsev 2012) .
In order to rigorously explore uncertainties in the underlying climate and human processes, the IGSM is purpose built as a model of intermediate complexity. Relatively light computational burdens imply that the IGSM can be solved repeatedly across an array of crucial parameter values relating to all three primary components. By specifying joint distributions for key parameters and drawing points from these distributions (Sobol Monte Carlo is employed), hybrid frequency distributions (HFDs) of climate outcomes can be generated and analyzed conditional on a global mitigation policy regime (Webster et al. 2012 ). As such, the IGSM represents one of the first and most detailed attempts to characterize the distribution of future climate outcomes.
The drive to characterize a distribution of future climates comes at the cost of regional detail. On its own, the IGSM generates only zonal outputs (outputs by latitude band). Schlosser et al. (2013) propose an approach to developing regional hybrid frequency distributions of climate outcomes. This approach is operationalized for the ZRB by Schlosser and Strzepek (2015) . In the approach, projections of regional changes in surface-air temperature and precipitation over the ZRB were developed by combining outputs from the IGSM with pattern-change kernels from climate-model results of the Coupled Model Inter-Comparison Project (Meehl et al. 2007 ).
The approach of Schlosser and Strzepek (2015) produces a distribution containing 6800 potential future climates. For the purposes of detailed biophysical and economic analysis, 6800 climates is computationally burdensome. develop an approach, rooted in the numerical integration literature, to intelligently choose a weighted subset of approximately 400 climates for detailed analysis.
Runoff in the ZRB is modeled using a variant of the CliRun modeling framework, which is based on an approach first proposed by Kaczmarek (1993) . Agricultural yields and irrigation water demands were assessed based on a variant of the CliCrop model (Fant et al. 2012) . Results from these models serve as inputs into a water resources systems model, based on the approach of Sieber and Purkey (2007) , for assessment of flood risk, hydropower output, and balancing of water supply and demand across competing uses. Fant et al. (2015) describe the application of this modeling suite (CliRun, CliCrop, and water resources) to the ZRB.
Sea level rise and cyclone strike apply only to Mozambique. Neumann et al. (2013) describe the approach employed for assessing these risks. Country level economy-wide models, one each for Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia, aggregate the impacts derived from the various biophysical models described above within the context of a market economy. As discussed in Arndt and Thurlow (2015) , this modeling approach has the dual advantages that (i) it respects all macroeconomic constraints and (ii) it is detailed permitting, for example, differential implications of climate change for the same crop by region within a country.
As noted, the modeling framework employed arguably represents the most detailed and advanced effort ever applied to a developing country. The modeling philosophy seeks to create plausible mathematical representations of the most prominent and relevant biophysical and economic characteristics of the case countries. These representations are then exposed to sets of future climates for the ZRB, 426 climates for the UE scenario and 398 for the L1S scenario, that represent the best available estimation of the distribution of future climates to 2050 by emissions stabilization scenario. The modeling framework thus produces distributions of climate, biophysical, and economic outcomes by emissions stabilization scenario. These distributions are in focus in the discussion of results.
Results

Climate outcomes
We find notable differences in climate outcomes between the unconstrained emissions (UE) and the mitigation scenario (L1S) for the ZRB as a whole by 2050. Schlosser and Strzepek (2015) provide a detailed description of the results obtained for sub-regions of the ZRB. Here, we begin with frequency distributions of spring (September-November, SON) precipitation change ( Figure 2 , left panel). In the unconstrained emissions scenario, the mode of the distribution of precipitation shifts toward drier outcomes, although both substantial increases and decreases in precipitation are possible. Under L1S climate policy, the range of outcomes is reduced. Notably, the most extreme drying outcomes (decreases of -0.5 mm/day and higher) are removed. Nevertheless, even under L1S, precipitation remains likely to decrease, with 42 per cent of the L1S distribution at or below a decrease of -0.2 mm/day in spring (SON) precipitation.
For surface-air temperature (Figure 2 , right panel), the L1S scenario reduces the modal value of the summer (December-February, DJF) temperature-change distribution by at least 1˚ C (less warming), with 56 per cent of the distribution within a 1˚-1.5˚C increase in summer temperature -contrasted by nearly 56 per cent of the UE distribution spanning summer temperature increases exceeding 2.5˚C. Similar to what we show for precipitation, strong mitigation eliminates the occurrences of the most extreme temperature increases and shifts the distribution leftward. Specifically, the upper half of the UE distribution of change (exceeding 2.5˚C warming) is excluded in the L1S range of occurrences. Additionally, we find that the minimum warming in the distributions is less affected, indicating that even in the very aggressive mitigation scenario considered for this study, the likelihood of some degree of climate warming, combined with changes in precipitation, are unavoidable.
Global fossil fuel prices
The prices of fossil fuels are determined by the supply and demand for fossil fuels, considering interactions with alternative fuels that can act as substitutes. As fossil fuel resources deplete, the cost of production for additional resources tends to rise tempered by gains in extractive technologies.
Technological progress also has implications on the demand side through improvements in energy efficiency. Figure 3 shows indices of world producer prices for coal, oil, and natural gas. The indices are constructed as a ratio of the price in the climate policy scenario (L1S) relative to the price in the no climate policy scenario (UE). For illustrative purposes, the figure extends to 2100 even though the focus of our analysis is to 2050.
For oil producers, the L1S climate policy brings lower producer prices relative to UE due to a reduction in oil demand and competition from biofuels. Substantial margins between the cost of production and sale prices result in large price reductions when oil producers try to minimize oil demand reductions. By about 2050, oil prices that producers receive are lower by 60 per cent in the L1S scenario in comparison to UE. This difference grows to almost 80 per cent by the end of the century.
Coal producers also face price decreases under the climate policy, but most of them are already producing close to their marginal costs; therefore, they are not able to reduce their margins. Instead, carbon policies drastically reduce demand for (and production of) coal with some revival when carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology becomes economic. By 2050 and 2100, coal prices that producers receive are lower by about 10 per cent and 25 per cent respectively in L1S compared with UE.
Natural gas price dynamics are more complicated. There are three segments. In the first segment, L1S prices are higher than in the UE scenario due to a switch from coal to natural gas. In the second, tighter emission targets make natural gas less attractive as it still emits carbon, and there is a need to move to even lower carbon emitting technologies such as wind, solar, and bioenergy. In the third, two factors serve to push up the price of natural gas relative to UE. The first factor is larger shares of renewables entering the power generation mix. Natural gas producer prices rise (relative to UE) because natural gas serves as a means to resolve intermittency issues. This is the smaller of the two factors. Natural gas is also used with CCS in the second half of the century, which is the larger factor.
The key point is that the price of the most traded fossil fuel, oil, is significantly lower under the L1S policy regime compared with UE. Global emissions policies also cause changes in the prices of other commodities, such as agriculture. However, the relative price shifts are much less pronounced.
Runoff
Runoff supplies rivers and reservoirs with surface water. Increases in runoff imply that more surface water is available for various uses, including irrigation and hydropower production, although this availability also depends on water resource management as well as available storage and diversion. Decreases in runoff are likely to result in less water available for irrigation and hydropower production while rapid increases in runoff correlate with flood events. For this reason, runoff is a convenient indicator of how changes in climate translate into changes in water availability, which then affects economic outcomes.
The per cent change in mean annual runoff, aggregated from 29 to five major basins, is shown in Figure 4 . The graphs within the figure contain the percentage change on the horizontal axis and the estimated kernel density (a measure of likelihood) on the vertical axis. Below each graph, the baseline mean annual runoff is shown as a proxy for the hydrologic significance of each basin. Also, the 10 th and 90 th percentiles of the modeled historical period-1951 to 1990-are shown in order to illustrate the magnitude of the climate scenario results as compared to the inter-annual variability that has been observed over the 40-year baseline period. The percentage shifts in runoff shown in the graphs represent 10-year means (2041-2050).
For Cahora Basa, the mode from UE and L1S both rest at about zero change and the extremes reach about ±20 with very little difference between the two polices. The results are similar for the Shire River, although the UE case projects a slightly wetter future, and the overall expectation for both scenarios is also wetter with the mode at about +5 per cent. In the other three major basins, a decrease in runoff is more likely, at about -5 per cent for the mode value, which is about the same for both policy cases. However, the differences between the shapes of the two policy distributions are more prominent for these three major basins. In all cases the UE distribution is noticeably wider, with more extreme tails, reaching -50 per cent for both the Kafue and Upper Zambezi. These two major basins also show a slightly lower expected runoff for the UE than the L1S scenario.
These changes in runoff, along with changes in irrigation demands, are used to model water resource allocations in order to understand how these changes in surface water supply translate to changes in water availability for the various users. From these modeling efforts, we find that the water sector in Malawi is the least sensitive to climate change. Alternatively, Zambia is predicted to experience losses in terms of hydropower generation, caused mostly by expected decreases in runoff in the west, as well as upstream irrigation demands. The impacts on hydropower generation in Mozambique are likely to be mild due to a portfolio type effect stemming from a large contributing area. However, large-scale, high-damage flood events are projected to happen more often, especially under UE policy; and irrigation demands are more likely to be unmet.
Economic outcomes
We elect to focus on the distribution of the average level of GDP over the period 2046-2050 for each of the three case countries. These outcomes are illustrated in Figure 5 , where panels a, b, and c correspond to outcomes for Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia respectively. For each country, we show three distributions of GDP outcomes corresponding to (i) the unconstrained emissions case, (ii) level 1 stabilization with world prices maintained at levels from the unconstrained emissions case, and (iii) level 1 stabilization with corresponding world prices. The horizontal axis shows the GDP level as compared to a no climate change baseline. The vertical axis presents a measure of likelihood (kernel density estimates) for the associated GDP outcome under climate change.
The sources of GDP losses in the UE scenario relative to the no climate change baseline are discussed in detail in Arndt and Thurlow (2015) . Our focus is on comparing the UE with the L1S global policy scenario. Relative to UE, L1S mitigation policy generates two distinct benefits. First, the distribution of economic outcomes shifts notably to the right (favourably) due uniquely to reduced disruption from climate change as a consequence of reduced temperature rise and a reduced likelihood of strong movements in precipitation (shown by the distribution corresponding to L1S climate with UE world prices). The extent of the shift varies by case country. It is most pronounced in Mozambique driven principally by a substantial reduction in flood probabilities.
Corresponding to the reduced dispersion of climate outcomes shown in Figure 1 and biophysical outcomes as in Figure 4 , economic outcomes also tend to be less dispersed under effective mitigation. This is particularly true for the low income economies, Mozambique and Malawi, where climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture play a larger role in GDP. Overall, the distributions of economic outcomes in 2050 exhibit higher mean and reduced variance purely as a consequence of less pronounced changes in climate.
Second, like nearly all low income and most middle income developing countries, the case countries considered are substantial net importers of fossil fuels, particularly oil and derived products.
1 The reduced prices particularly for oil in the L1S scenario compared with UE scenario (see Figure 3 ) generate a gain in terms of trade, which in turn confers substantial benefits in terms of economic growth (and welfare). In countries participating in the mitigation regime, these terms of trade shifts would be accompanied by the costs of transitioning to more expensive energy sources. For simplicity and in order to delineate a best case scenario for our case countries, we present economic outcomes whereby effective global mitigation occurs but the case countries do not participate. Hence, while avoiding mitigation costs, the case countries are able to import fossil fuels at substantially lower cost.
The combined effect of these two benefits is to shift the distribution of economic outcomes to the right with the mean GDP outcome improving by about two to six percentage points relative to the 1 Mozambique has recently discovered substantial reserves of natural gas and coal. Limited exploitation of coal reserves has already begun. Large scale exploitation of these resources will require very large and long term investments in extraction, transport infrastructure, and processing. The pace and nature of the exploitation of these resources is deeply uncertain. Mozambique is also a substantial exporter of hydropower, whose price might be expected to rise under global mitigation. And as shown in Figure 3 , gas prices are also mainly higher in the L1S scenario. Given the uncertainties, we opt to avoid projecting differential natural resource revenues across scenarios. See Arndt and Thurlow (2015) for more discussion. unconstrained emissions case. For Malawi and Mozambique, mean and mode outcomes are superior to the climate change baseline. For Zambia (a lower middle income country), the mean of the distribution of the GDP outcomes is only slightly worse than the no climate change baseline with about one fourth of the distribution lying above the no climate change baseline.
Developing country interests
For the case countries considered, successful global mitigation policies designed to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at around 560 ppm CO2eq generate benefits that are roughly on the order of or greater than the range of costs generally associated with mitigation policies looking out to about 2050 (Field et al. 2014) . For low income countries such as Mozambique and Malawi, special and differential treatment in terms of participation in the global mitigation regime can be reasonably assumed to pertain, at least until those countries attain middle income status. For these two countries and for low income countries generally, successful global mitigation, with delayed adherence to a global mitigation regime, may well be preferred to a (fictional) no climate change baseline, even in the absence of any concessionary climate finance.
Zambia, as a lower middle income country, is likely to be a different case. Given the prominent role of developing countries in emissions growth (Field et al. 2014) , middle income developing countries, including Zambia, are likely to be expected to participate in a global mitigation regime, with implications for growth. Zambia's actual growth trajectory will then also depend on the mitigation options available and the efficiency of its mitigation policies.
2 Nevertheless, the results presented here imply a degree of space for the case countries to achieve global mitigation objectives and to simultaneously maintain or exceed the growth trajectory that, to date, has been the default, unconstrained emissions.
While the focus has been on the case countries, these are likely to be fairly general results across developing countries. The increases in temperature and shifts in precipitation inherent in climate change appear to be unlikely to be net beneficial to most developing countries even in the relatively near term. In addition, the world price shifts that are highly likely to be inherent in successful global mitigation effectively provide a substantial automatic transfer mechanism to structural fuel importers. This latter result is both quite general, in that most developing countries are large structural fuel importers, and surprisingly unexplored. In essence, the two scenarios considered, UE and L1S, present to most developing countries a choice between (i) generally rising energy import cost burdens (under UE) or (ii) the complexities of undertaking an energy transformation in collaboration, but not necessarily in lockstep, with the rest of the world (in L1S).
With respect to developing countries that are net fossil fuel exporters, their terms of trade will decline. Globally, changes in terms of trade are, essentially, a zero sum game. Nevertheless, a large literature finds that fossil fuel endowments are frequently a 'curse' with respect to GDP growth dynamics in developing countries Sachs and Warner 2001; Frankel 2010) . Hence, world price declines for fossil fuels are not necessarily a bad thing even for the populations of fossil fuel exporters when taking a long run development perspective.
Why are these fuel price effects so rarely considered? While fossil fuel terms of trade effects are present in mitigation assessments based on models such as EPPA, the implications are often substantially reduced through aggregation. For example, an aggregate region 'sub-Saharan Africa' within a global economy-wide modeling framework is effectively, in economic terms, South Africa with oil (via Nigeria and Angola among others). The results produced here cannot emerge from an aggregate representation of sub-Saharan Africa. For a proper analysis, one needs a tool with the ability to project global energy markets and prices combined with detailed country-level models, as developed here.
To close, we note that oil price dynamics and the corresponding changes in terms of trade are challenging to project. Even models such as EPPA, arguably among the best available tools for assessing long-term price dynamics for fossil fuels across policy regimes, do not capture all aspects of strategic behaviour in oil markets. Credible commitments to global emission reductions might influence producers to increase production in the near term, potentially causing the relative price shifts depicted in Figure 3 to occur earlier in time. This would further magnify the benefits experienced by the case countries considered here. Quantifying uncertainty about potential climate policies and possible strategic reactions of fossil-fuel producers offers an important avenue for future research. 
